Commission v World Duty Free Group a.o.: selectivity in (fiscal) State aid: quo vadis Curia? by Derenne, Jacques
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2017, Vol. 8, No. 5 311
Current Intelligence
Commission v World Duty
Free Group a.o.: Selectivity
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Judgement of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2016
in joined cases C-20/15P and C-21/15 Commission v
World Duty Free Group (formerly Autogrill España),
Banco Santander & Santusa Holding, EU:C:2016:981.
The selectivity criterion can be satisﬁed even though the
measure is available to all undertakings and its applica-
tion merely depends upon the choice of undertakings
adopting the relevant activity. It is not necessary to
identify a particular category of undertakings for a ﬁscal
measure to be selective.
I. Legal context
On 21 December 2016, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) assessed how and to what
extent ﬁscal measures can fall within the meaning of
State aid under Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The con-
dition of selectivity, undoubtedly the most problematic
condition, especially when it comes to ﬁscal measures,
was on the chopping block. To date, neither the
Commission’s decisional practice nor the EU case law
have succeeded in bringing the necessary clarity to this
discussion.
II. Facts
The World Duty Free Group/Santander case concerns a
Spanish tax measure which provided that, in the event
that an undertaking taxable in Spain acquires a share-
holding in a foreign company of at least 5 percent of
that company’s capital, the goodwill stemming from the
shareholding could be deducted, in the form of an
amortisation, from the corporate tax for which the
undertaking is liable.
In two 2011 decisions, the Commission declared the
contested scheme unlawful and incompatible with the
internal market. Autogrill España (now World Duty
Free Group) challenged the ﬁrst decision before the
General Court; Banco Santander and Santusa Holding
the second.
On 7 November 2014, the General Court annulled
the Commission decisions (T-219/10 Autogrill España,
EU:T:2014:939 and T-399/11 Banco Santander and
Santusa Holding, EU:T:2014:938). The General Court
identiﬁed a violation of the notion of selectivity without
examining the other pleas (lack of selectivity due to the
nature of the system, failure to correctly identify the ref-
erence system, lack of advantage and lack of reasons).
In that regard, it is well known that the conditions for a
measure to constitute State aid are cumulative and thus,
failure to meet one requirement results in there being
no aid.
The General Court found that the measure was not
selective for several reasons: ﬁrstly, where the measure
at issue, even though it constitutes a derogation from
the common or ‘normal’ tax regime (a point not ultim-
ately decided by the General Court), is potentially avail-
able to all undertakings, it is not possible to compare
the legal and factual situation of undertakings which are
able to beneﬁt from the measure with that of undertak-
ings which cannot beneﬁt from it; secondly, for a meas-
ure to be selective, one must identify a category of
undertakings which are favoured by it; thirdly, selectiv-
ity cannot result from the mere ﬁnding that a deroga-
tion from a common or ‘normal’ tax regime has been
introduced, especially if that measure is a priori access-
ible to any undertaking; fourthly, the contested measure
is not limited to any particular type of business or eco-
nomic operation and a national measure does not con-
stitute State aid if it applies to all undertakings in the
national territory regardless of their activity.
III. Analysis
The European Commission relied on a single ground of
appeal comprising two limbs, based on an erroneous
interpretation of the condition of selectivity.
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A. No need to identify a group of undertakings
with speciﬁc characteristics
By the ﬁrst limb, the Commission claimed that the
General Court erred in law by holding that the
Commission should identify a group of undertakings
with speciﬁc characteristics in order to demonstrate that
the measure is selective.
According to the CJEU, the crux of the issue is
whether a measure can be classiﬁed as ‘discriminatory’:
what should be assessed is whether ‘a national measure is
such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production
of certain goods’ over other undertakings which, in the
light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a
comparable factual and legal situation and who accord-
ingly suffer different treatment that can, in essence, be
classiﬁed as discriminatory’ (para. 54 of the judgement).
With regard to national measures ‘conferring a tax
advantage’, the CJEU considers that when they place
their beneﬁciaries in a more favourable position than
other taxpayers, they are likely to provide a ‘selective
advantage’. However, they do not constitute aid if the tax
advantage results from a general measure applicable
without distinction to all economic operators (para. 56).
The CJEU then sets out the three steps the
Commission must take to identify a national tax meas-
ure as selective: (i) the Commission must identify the
ordinary tax system; (ii) the tax measure at issue must
be a derogation from that system and the measure must
differentiate between comparable operators, in the light
of the objective pursued by that ordinary tax system
(para. 57); and (iii) differentiating measures may, ultim-
ately, not be construed as selective if the Member State
concerned is able to demonstrate that that differenti-
ation is justiﬁed since it ﬂows from the nature or gen-
eral structure of the system of which the measures form
part (para. 58); however, the mere fact that only tax-
payers satisfying the conditions for the application of a
measure can beneﬁt from it cannot in itself make it
selective (para. 59).
The contested tax measure confers an advantage on
all undertakings which carry out the relevant transac-
tions (acquisition of a shareholding in a foreign com-
pany of at least 5% of that company’s capital). In order
to be selective, the CJEU considered that it was up to
the Commission to establish, notwithstanding the gen-
eral application of the measure, that it conferred a bene-
ﬁt on certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity.
According to the CJEU, the General Court’s error stems
from it requiring the identiﬁcation, in all cases, of a par-
ticular category of undertakings which would be the
only ones favoured by the measure at issue and which
could be distinguished by speciﬁc and common proper-
ties (para. 71). To the contrary, for the Court, the
Commission should not be required to identify certain
speciﬁc features that are characteristics of and common
to the recipient undertakings, by which they must be
distinguished from those undertakings that are excluded
from the measure (para. 78). All that matters is that the
measure has the effect of placing the recipient undertak-
ings in a better position than other undertakings in a
comparable legal and factual situation (para. 79).
The CJEU’s judgement is limited to this point: the
General Court should not have required the Commission
to deﬁne a particular category of undertakings favoured
by the tax measure and should have determined whether
the Commission had analysed the discriminatory nature
of the measure.
B. A measure that beneﬁts cross-border
transactions, but excludes the same domestic
transactions, is selective
The second limb requires less discussion. The .Commis-
sion argued that the General Court erred in law by its
application of the case law on export aid and that it had
made an artiﬁcial distinction between export aid and aid
for the export of capital (para. 115).
Relying on Advocate General Wathelet’s Opinion, the
CJEU held that the case law cannot be understood as
meaning that a national measure must necessarily be clas-
siﬁed as selective where that measure beneﬁts exclusively
undertakings that export goods or services (paras. 117 and
118). On the contrary, a measure designed to facilitate
exports may be regarded as selective if it beneﬁts undertak-
ings carrying out cross-border transactions and is to the
disadvantage of other undertakings which, while in a com-
parable factual and legal situation, carry out transactions
of the same kind within the national territory (para. 119).
C. Next steps
As the General Court failed to examine three of the four
pleas relied on by the applicants and did not examine,
within the ﬁrst plea, whether the undertakings that did not
meet the conditions for obtaining the tax advantage were
in a comparable factual and legal situation to those
favoured by the measure, the cases were referred back to it.
IV. Practical signiﬁcance
As one of the cumulative conditions for the ﬁnding of
State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, selectivity is dis-
tinct from and not to be confused with the other four
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conditions. A State measure conferring an advantage by
means of State resources, distorting competition and
affecting trade between Member States would not con-
stitute State aid unless it is selective. Nevertheless, it has
often been treated as an ‘accessory’ to the condition that
there be an advantage.
It should be recalled that the two concepts require a
‘comparison’ which is distinct in nature: the ‘advantage’
results from a comparison with the ‘normal market con-
ditions’ (in fact, a counterfactual analysis: what would
have been done in these conditions?); the ‘selectivity’
results from a comparison with what the State actually
does, not with what it should have done.
Rather than formulate a clear interpretation of selectiv-
ity insofar as it refers to a situation in which a differenti-
ation is introduced between undertakings in a comparable
legal and factual situation, the Court interpreted selectivity
in an overly extensive manner. In doing so, the CJEU has
contributed to the devaluation of the condition. Indeed,
following the CJEU’s approach, even though the advan-
tage from the measure is available to any tax contributor
(without any condition but the ‘incited activity’), such a
measure will constitute aid merely if it has the effect of
conferring a beneﬁt on a select few: those opting to carry
out the activity concerned. The CJEU deduces the exist-
ence of selectivity from the mere fact that undertakings
will be favoured over others being in comparable situa-
tions (a point still to be demonstrated in casu), thereby
only retaining the effect of the measure (which rather
relates to the ‘advantage’ criterion).
However, one could argue that this is not the effect of
the measure itself but rather the effect of the choice of
the undertakings selecting or not to invest in foreign
companies. Here, it was not a measure which reserved
itself for certain undertakings, it was a measure which
provided an advantage to those undertakings which
chose to engage in a certain activity, a choice available
to all, without any discrimination. An unconditional tax
advantage linked to an activity accessible to any under-
taking does not appear to be selective. Notwithstanding,
one loophole remains: where a measure that is a priori
selective escapes qualiﬁcation as State aid due to the
nature and general structure of the tax system. This last
condition depends on evidence to be adduced by the
Member State claiming the beneﬁt of that exception,
often qualiﬁed as a probatio diabolica.
Not only does this judgement fuel confusion and calls
into question a number of ﬁscal measures which until
now had not appeared to constitute State aid, it also
fuels concern that the Commission could control virtu-
ally all measures of direct taxation, a competence funda-
mentally retained by the Member States (the CJEU did
not respond to the arguments raised by the intervening
Member States—see para. 52) . Of course, Member
States are not immune from State aid control when
adopting tax measures but one can wonder whether the
notion of selectivity is not construed too broadly with
the result of the application of State aid control instead
of internal market rules in certain circumstances.
This case highlights the difﬁculty of applying the
selectivity criterion in tax cases. A tax measure, which is
available to all who chose, is selective because recipient
undertakings were placed in a more favourable position
than other undertakings in a comparable situation. Does
that not then actually mean ‘advantage’?
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